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Scope of the Right of Way Privilege
By

LELAND

E.

MODESITT*

In traffic cases the import of the right of way is commonly misconceived. Frequently the law by which such a right is conferred is
misconstrued, particularly by the lower courts. The courts so consistently decline to define the phrase "right of way" that one readily
infers it to be a matter of common knowledge. Various definitions of
the right of way privilege have been drafted:
"Right of way is the privilege of immediate use of the street
or highway."'
"Right of way merely means a preference to one of two vehicles asserting right of passage at the same place and at approximately the same time.' '2
"Right of way means the right of a vehicle to proceed uninterruptedly in a lawful manner in the direction in which it is
moving in preference to another vehicle approaching from a different direction into its path." 3
These definitions serve to describe generally a relative right which
is inherently a nebulous conception and which becomes a concrete right
only in the light of the circumstances of each case.
The regulation with which we are chiefly concerned is that which
provides that every driver of a vehicle approaching an intersection shall
yield the right of way to the driver of the vehicle approaching from the
right. This is the Denver ordinance 4 and the usual rule adopted in
municipalities. The Colorado statute-" and the ordinances of some of
the smaller communities vary materially from this in their practical
application.
*Of the Denver bar.
'Denver Municipal Traffic Code. §1; Ordinance No. 16, Series of 1932, §1;
COLO. STAT. ANN. (1935 c. 16, §76 (dd).

In the statutory definition the word

"street"2 is omitted.
Cow'an v. Market Street Ry. Co., 8 Cal. App. (2d) 642, 646, 47 P. (2d) 752,
754 (1935).
'Kling v. George Ast Candy Co., 33 Ohio App. 177, 179, 168 N. E. 761 (1929).
'Supra note 1, §65 (a).
5
COLO. STAT. ANN. (1935) t. 16, §208.
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That the driver on the left is at a disadvantage from the beginning,
is a certainty, but the cases and decisions indicate clearly that the driver
on the right is amenable to all of the laws created for public safety. The
driver on the right has no license to proceed with reckless abandon; sometimes he has no right to proceed at all. His privilege is conditional
upon his ability to exercise it with reason and discretion.
In Ward v. Clark,' Mr. Justice Cardozo stated:
"The plaintiff [the driver on the left] in shaping his own
course might act upon the assumption that common skill and
prudence would shape the defendant's also. He was not required
to foresee the defendant's blind and uncompromising adherence to
an undeviating line. The supreme rule of the road is the rule of
mutual forbearance."
The Colorado decisions on the right of way question are not
numerous, but are adequate to furnish an understandable perspective.
In Golden Eagle Dry Goods Company v. Mockbee7 the court
stated that it was the duty of every driver on approaching a street intersection to see whether there was liklihood of a collision with another
car approaching from the right, and if there was, to yield the right of
way and to keep his car under such control that he could do so. The
plaintiff was driving an automobile southward on South University
Boulevard in Denver. As she was crossing the intersection at East
Evans Avenue s a motor delivery car of the defendant, driven eastward
by defendant's servant, collided with plaintiff's car and injured her. The
plaintiff recovered damages in the lower court, but the decision was
reversed because of an erroneous instruction. This was one of the first
cases involving the Denver right of way ordinance, and the instruction
complained of was based upon language in the ordinance similar to
that of the present Colorado statute which confers a privilege upon the
automobile first reaching the intersection. The instruction was considered erroneous, because in effect it would repeal the Denver ordinance
and because it was impracticable. It was stated, however, that the lower
court was clearly right in warning the jury that one having the right of
way is not absolved from the duty of exercising reasonable care and
may not approach the intersection at a negligent rate.
6232 N.Y. 195, 198, 133 N. E. 443 (1921).
'68 Colo. 312, 189 Pac. 850 (1920).

8
At the date of this case both Evans Avenue and University Boulevard were designated as "streets" and neither was a stop or through street.
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In Rosenbaum v. Riggs' the plaintiff, who was the driver on the
left, was denied recovery because his own admissions established his
contributory negligence. He testified that he was going from eight to
ten miles an hour and could have stopped within five or six feet had he
desired. However, he saw no reason why he should give the right of
way to the defendant, who was some one hundred feet away when
plaintiff proceeded into the intersection. The rule handed down placed
a duty upon the driver to look to the right when nearing a crossing.
and if he sees, or could have seen an approaching car in time to stop and
neglects to do so, he is guilty of contributory negligence. The court
stated that the plaintiff should have assumed that the defendant, having
the right of way, would probably continue at a high rate of speed, and
therefore was negligent in not stopping when he could easily have
done so.
In St. Mary's Academy v. Newhagen' ° the court considered the
plaintiff negligent as a matter of law in not looking to the right immediately before she proceeded into the intersection. She had seen the
defendant's car on the right some 300 feet from the intersection, when
her own car was about 80 feet therefrom. Fearing danger from the
left because of a building which intercepted her view from that direction, she did not look again to the right, because, she said, she did
not have time, but continued to look to the left until the car she was
driving was struck by defendant's car. The negligence of the driver of
the car on the right was conclusively established, but the plaintiff was
denied recovery because of her own carelessness in not looking again to
the right to ascertain defendant's position at the moment she entered
the intersection. Whether the defendant had abused the privilege, or had
lost his right of way because of reckless driving was not considered.
In each of the Colorado cases previously considered the defendant
won a judgment by virtue of the right of way ordinance, and the
right of way as a defense in a negligence action was almost unquestioned
until Boyd v. Close" was decided. In this case the cars did not meet
while crossing an intersection at right angles; they were proceeding in
opposite directions along the same street, and the accident occurred when
the plaintiff turned to the left in front of the defendant's oncoming
"75 Colo. 408, 222 Pac. 134 (1924).
"77 Colo. 471, 238 Pac. 21 (1925).
'82 Colo. 150. 257 Pac. 1079 (1927).
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car. The defendant contended that he had the right of way because the
plaintiff became the driver on the left in making the left turn. Corroborated testimony showed the defendant's car was in fact approaching at
45 miles an hour, its driver was drunk and reckless, he did not signal,
slow down, turn or use his brakes. He covered the intervening 300 feet
while the plaintiff was going 90 feet. The court held for the plaintiff.
stating that it could not fix responsibility in every case of automobile
crossing collisions in favor of the car having the right of way under
the strict provisions of the ordinance or statute notwithstanding drunkenness, gross negligence, excessive speed and every reasonable caution
exercised by the other.
Golden Eagle Dry Goods Company v. Mockbee, 1 2 Rosenbaum v.
Riggs, 3 and St. Mary's Academy v. Newhagen,14 which were cited by
defendant, were held not to sustain his contention. The court stated
that Rosenbaum v. Riggs was not applicable because the plaintiff there
knew that defendant was approaching at an excessive speed, knew that
a collision was imminent, could have avoided it but did not even make
the attempt, and that the same facts existed in St. Mary's Academy case.
The court stated in Boyd v. Close, that to deny the plaintiff recovery
under the circumstances there set forth would be in effect to outlaw every
driver on the left and give carte blanche to every driver on the right to
run him down. It considered the mere statement of such a proposition
its own refutation.
Failure to observe what a reasonably prudent person in her position could have observed was considered contributory negligence on
the part of the plaintiff in Kracaw v. Micheletti. 5 The undisputed evidence showed that the plaintiff was traveling at a moderate speed and
when she reached a point about 15 feet from the intersection she saw
defendant's car approaching about 200 feet distant. She continued to
watch defendant's car, but could not ascertain its speed. She thought
she had time to cross ahead of it, but as a consequence of making an
attempt a collision ensued. The accident occurred in broad daylight.
The court held that plaintiff negligently proceeded to take the right of
way, and upheld a directed verdict for the defendant, even though the
"2Supra note 7.
"Supra note 9.
"Supra note 10.
"'85Colo. 384, 276 Pac. 333 (1929).
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latter's excessive and negligent speed was clearly established by the
evidence.
The case was distinguished from Boyd v. Close16 on the basis of
a materially different fact situation. In Boyd v. Close the accident occured at night, during a snow storm, and the cars were approaching
head on. Under these circumstances the court-felt that the plaintiff
could not properly be charged with notice of defendant's excessive speed,
and not having actual notice to the contrary, could assume that the defendant was driving in a lawful manner. In other words, he drove
according to the hypothetical standard of a reasonably prudent person
under the same circumstances and could not be charged with negligently
taking the right of way. In Kracaw u. Micheletti the plaintiff could
have ascertained by the exercise of reasonable diligence that the defendant's car was approaching at a high rate of speed, and her failure to yield
the right of way under these circumstances was considered manifest
negligence. She had no right to proceed across the intersection on the
assumption that the defendant was driving in a careful and prudent
manner when she should have had positive notice to the contrary.
In Campion v. Eakle,17 the court set forth the rule that although
one driving an automobile may have the right of way, he is not absolved
from the duty of exercising reasonable care. However, this was a guest
case and the negligence of the driver to the left in not yielding the right
of way was not directly in issue.
In Hicks v. Cramer,", an instruction to the effect that even if the
plaintiff had the right of way, if he failed to exercise due care, and
such failure was a contributing cause of the accident, he could not recover, was held to be the applicable law.
The interpretation of the right of way rule was a cardinal point in
Stocher v. Newcomb."9 The plaintiffs' car was proceeding across the
intersection at less than twelve miles per hour when it was struck by
defendant's automobile approaching from the right. Plaintiff did not
even see defendant's car whe,n she started to cross the intersection, but
saw it. coming very fast when it was almost upon her. Defendant's
0

' Supra note 11.
1779 Colo. 320, 246 Pac. 280 (1926).
885 Colo. 409, 277 Pac. 499 (1929).

"p91 Colo. 479, 15 P. (2d)

975 (1932).
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estimated speed was about 50 miles per hour. However, defendant contended that the plaintiff was contributorily negligent in taking the right
of way. The court felt otherwise, stating:
"The rule that an automobile driver on the left should yield
the right of way to one on the right does not carry with it a
license for excessive speed or reckless driving on the part of anyone. Drivers on the right are as amenable to the law as those on
the left; the rule is one of safety and to facilitate traffic; it is
promulgated for the use of the traveling public and not for abuse.
The rule does not deprive others of their right to the use of the
public highways. In Boyd v. Close . . . we repudiated the notion

that there is such a thing as an unlawful right of way, and we
have not changed our minds." 20
A recent case of considerable significance to the profession and of
great moment to the press was Buerger Brothers Supply Company v.
Denver Fire Reporter and Protective Company.2 t There the plaintiff had
the right of way and was traveling 8 to 10 miles per hour as he proceeded into the intersection. He kept looking to the right because there
was a building on the corner which obstructed his vision. His vision to
the left was clear but he did not look to the left until he entered the
intersection. When he did so, he saw the defendant's car entering the
intersection. He stepped on the accelerator in an attempt to avoid a
collision but his increased speed was insufficient to cause his car to clear
and it was struck in the left rear portion.
The defendant in support of its motion for a nonsuit urged that
plaintiff's driver was guilty of contributory negligence as a matter of
law in not looking to the left before he entered the intersection, and the
lower court must have reached that conclusion, although it made no
specific finding to that effect. The Supreme Court reversed the holding
of the lower court granting the defendant's motion for nonsuit and
said:
"*

* * contributory negligence is not shown, because under the

ordinance the plaintiff had a right to be where he was, and at the
time owed no legal duty to yield the right of way to defendant ***
2

Supra note 19, at 485, 15 P. (2d)

'113 P. (2d) 671 (Colo. 1941).

at 977.
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We think that the plaintiff, under the doctrine announced in
Golden Eagle Co. v. Mockbee * * * and City and County of Denver

v. Henry * * * made out a prima facie ease and that the motion for
a nonsuit should have been overruled."

2

2

In citing Golden Eagle Dry Goods Company v. Mockbee 23 as authority for its decision the court indicates an affirmance of the principle
there laid down that the driver on the right is not absolved from the duty
of exercising due care. In other words, the question of reasonable care
on the part of the driver on the right should always be considered, but
at the same time it was error under the circumstances of the Buerger
Brothers case to find contributory negligence as a matter of law and to
direct a nonsuit based on that finding. It is true that the opinion contains language which might be construed as relieving the driver from
the duty of looking to the left, but it would seem that that language
should be construed in the light of the particular facts of the case.
"The language used in a court opinion must be interpreted in
the light of its use in the case under consideration, and confined to
the questions presented therein.-

24

One week after the Buerger Brothers case was decided the Supreme
Court handed down an opinion in Bauserman u. White. 2' The factual
situation there was that Mrs. White was riding as a guest in a car driven
by a Miss Berger, which was proceeding in a westerly direction on Glenarm Place. As the car approached the intersection of 13th Street and
Glenarm Place, Miss Berger stopped at the cross walk before proceeding
into the intersection in order to yield the right of way to a southbound
automobile stopped on 13th Street to her right. The driver of this car
motioned for Miss Berger to proceed across the intersection.' She complied, and when almost across the southbound car tracks the defendant's
car, driven southerly on 13th Street at a speed of 25 to 35 miles per
hour, came arou.nd the left of the car that was stopped, and struck the
rear portion of Miss Berger's car. The case was decided on the basis of
section 65 (d) of the Denver Traffic Code, 26 which reads as follows:
'Supra note 21, at 672.
'Supra note 7.

"City and County of Denver v. Henry, 95 Colo. 582, 585, 38 P. (2d) 895,
896 (1934).
-'114 P. (2d) 557 (Colo. 1941).
'Supra note 1.
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"Any driver or operator, while driving without lights at
such times as lights are required under Section 52 of this ordinance,
or while driving to the left of the center of the street, and reckless
driving, shall have no right of way whatever."
The court held that a driver approaching an intersection from the
right loses the right of way if he either drives to the left of the center of
the street or drives recklessly. Defendant's speed and his passing another
car near the intersection were accepted as ample proof of recklessness.
This was the first case to establish the relative or conditional nature
of the right of way privilege. I.n Rosenbaum v. Riggs27 and St. Mary's
Academy v. Newhagen 28 the right of way was the basis of the defense
of contributory negligence, notwithstanding the unlawful manner in
which the defendant exercised the right. Bauserman v. White, at least in
actions covered by the Denver ordinance, eliminated that basis if the
privilege was recklessly exercised.
In any attempt to harmonize the Colorado decisions on the right
of way rule it is imperative that the conditions and circumstances of
each case be analyzed and compared. Boyd v. Close 29 can be reconciled
with Rosenbaum v. Riggs30 because of the different circumstances under
which-the collision occurred in each case. It is also important to note
whether the person upon whom the right of way privilege is conferred
is the plaintiff or defendant. In a case where the defendant has the right
of way, a verdict might be directed for the defendant absolving him
from liability to the plaintiff, but this would not necessarily mean that
the defendant could recover his own damage from the plaintiff. In other
words, both parties might be guilty of negligence precluding either from
recovering from the other.
In conclusion it seems that the right of way privilege should never
constitute a license to abuse the other laws enacted for public safety.
It should be a conditional privilege existing only when the one upon
whom it is conferred can exercise it reasonably and solicitously; not
blindly and heedlessly. Such a construction would effect a more equitable disposition of the many traffic cases involving the right of way
privilege.
'Supra note 9.
'Supra note 10.
'Supra note 1 1.
'"Supra note 9.

